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The Myth of the Rational Market: Nudging Each Other Away from Fool’s Gold
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 8/7/09
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$99.66
130.01
117.91
160.94
87.42
49.00
90.56
103.37
278.01
$81.61
116.75
105.22
137.81
57.76
39.62
56.12
103.00
257.01
$81.14
120.38
104.99
141.49
48.38
       *
56.62
96.50
253.52
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.11
4.72
11.72
7.16
     *
4.52
3.04
10.35
5.02
2.15
4.25
3.01
11.54
5.12
2.09
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
190.00
77.50
85.00
162.50
64.00
        *
  
        *
        *
97.50
39.50
       *
       *
       *
85.00
32.25
*No Market
A flurry of media commentary and several new books
are focused on the recent financial crisis and near economic
collapse. A Newsweek article by Zakaria (2009), “Greed is
Good (To a Point),” suggests reconsidering the role of
greed in capitalism. This is also the theme in Fools Gold
(Tett, 2009), a story about the way derivatives markets have
evolved: showing greed at its worst. In many ways this is
the core source of the current set of problems. In some
sense, these perspectives are integrated in The Myth of the
Rational Market by Fox (2009), who traces the thinking on
the efficient market hypothesis, now understood for what
it is: a myth. Both books are based in large part on
interviews with major players in the crisis. There are also
books drawing mainly on science, but still quite accessible
to general readers, as represented in Nudge by Thaler and
Sunstein (2008). Both have done extensive research on
human foibles in economic choice.  There is also Animal
Spirits (Akerlof and Schiller, 2009), a book about what
Keynesian economics is really about, a look at human
forces at work. Akerlof is a Nobel prize winner in
economics, who before this  has pointed to the problems
with presuming rationality in real markets. Schiller is one
of the few economists who predicted these events.
   The story starts with a group of traders within J.P.
Morgan who set out in the early 1990s to enhance the
efficiency of credit markets: derivatives would become the
answer. One of the first credit derivative trades arose (Tett,
2009, pp. 46-47) from Exxon’s request for a $4.8 billion
credit line in case they would have to pay upwards of $5
billion in fines due to the Valdez oil tanker spill. J.P.
Morgan wanted to oblige this old customer; there was
commitment and loyalty at stake.  Yet this would require a
large capital reserve, and would not produce much profit.
Exxon was a low risk borrower, and rates would be modest.
J.P. Morgan was aware that the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) had a large
amount of credit available to extend to companies, but was
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restrained from making high risk loans so was looking for
higher returns. J. P. Morgan saw a potential opportunity,
in effect selling the risk to EBRD and freeing capital
reserves, with a win-win for everyone… economic
efficiency at work. Exxon got a credit line, J.P. Morgan
demonstrated commitment to a customer while reducing
credit reserves, and EBRD gained increased returns while
buying the (low) risk. Derivatives markets on credit lines
were born, based on the efficient market hypothesis, which
is oblivious to community and social context. 
This hypothesis has been considered a landmark in
20  century economic thinking (Fox, 2009, p. 43). The factth
that market prices cannot with any high degree of accuracy
be forecasted, suggests that the market knows best, being
perfectly efficient. This became the mantra of the
“Chicago (Economics) School,” with said market to be
unfettered, not nudged. Milton Friedman, a prominent
member of this school, argues that assumptions underlying
economic theories, no matter how unrealistic, (e.g. greed-
is-good) did not matter (Fox, 2009, p. 76). This is an
argument which generations of economists bought. All
that mattered was how well the theory predicted. The
efficient market hypothesis seemed to do this, so that
everyone in the markets somehow knew, together, the best
direction for prices as though guided by an invisible hand. 
Magically, the market would regulate itself. 
So what went wrong? Well, it is really very simple. 
The efficient market hypothesis is a myth, because it is
premised on perfectly rational humans, which we are not. 
Instead, we are prone to  intemperance (especially greed),
overconfidence, running-on-automatic with little cognitive
and rational consideration, less than perfect self-control
and are especially prone to herd-like behavior. These kinds
of behaviors drove the overheated economies of the 1920s
leading to the 1930’s Great Depression, and the “irrational
exuberance” (attributed to Alan Greenspan, see Fox, 2009,
p. 257) of the 1990s and early-2000s, which led to the
crisis in 2008. Herd activity, especially in panics (Akerlof
and Schiller, p. 64), is a prominent component of our
animal spirit(s). We spread the derivatives markets into
credit, interest, currency and yes, even into taking the risk
out of the sub-prime home mortgage markets, or so the
herd believed. 
Overall, perhaps enough cannot be said about the role
of tempered greed, demonstrated by the exceptions. J. P.
Morgan (now JP Morgan Chase), emerged virtually
unscathed due to tempered compensation schemes and
commitment to customers (Tett, 2009, pp. 243-254).  As
Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 72) argue, there is a need for
a “golden rule of libertarian paternalism” … nudging each
other to ensure we are all helped, while minimizing
individual harm. In other words, we need freedom of
choice (libertarian, child-like freedom), which is
occasionally nudged (paternalistic, parent-like nurturing,
giving context), onto better paths. If everyone is doing it,
first empathizing ... the strong version of the more
traditional golden rule of envisioning-oneself-in-the-shoes-
of-others and asking the empathy question: “How would I
wish to be treated in that situation?”… and then nudging
each other on the basis of this kind of empathy based
paternalism, the markets start to work. Greed is good to a
point, tempered by the shared wisdom about and the shared
other-interest in what is reasonable. The myth is that we are
in this alone, and that we can rely on the magic of an
invisible hand to achieve efficiency. Rather, we are in this
together, and through empathy and appropriate, visible
nudges (and yes, some regulation when nudging fails), we
move forward individually and together in sustainable
ways. The right price emerges with empathy-based
nudging: This is true market efficiency.
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